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THE INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW PREREQUISITE 
FOR AN INJUNCTION 
DouG RENDLEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past century and a half, American courts have repeatedly articu-
lated a uniform standard for the granting of an injunction instead of money 
damages. To win injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that his injury is 
irreparable with money or that money is an inadequate remedy. Plaintiff's dam-
age remedy is inadequate if it is less efficient, speedy and practical. Plaintiff's 
injury is irreparable by money when it cannot be measured, compensated, re-
stored, or repaired.t 
This article seeks to formulate a frame of reference for analysis of the in-
adequacy prerequisite. It assumes that the defendant has been injuring or is 
about to injure an interest protected by the substantive law; it omits the re-
lated inquiry, whether the harm is sufficiently imminent to enjoin. This article 
assumes also that the plaintiff seeks a final or permanent injunction after a 
plenary hearing on the merits, excluding another related inquiry, whether the 
judge should award plaintiff a preliminary injunction. After some background, 
the article identifies the reasons why the inadequacy prerequisite is less prom-
inent today than it was in the early 19th century. Next, the prerequisite's con-
temporary role will be evaluated by examining economic and moral reasons to 
enjoin, as well as administrative factors that militate against an injunction. Al-
though commentators argue that the inadequacy prerequisite has no role to 
play in modern equity adjudication, this article concludes that the prerequisite 
continues to serve an important function, although it may be applied improp-
erly by failing to focus the decisionmaker's critical faculties on the proper 
issues. By identifying the crucial features in the inadequacy decision, this 
article hopes to persuade the chancellor to evaluate the content and policy 
underlying the decision to grant an injunction. 
BACKGROUND 
Remedial doctrine does not concern itself with defining substantive inter-
ests but, instead, concerns itself with the proper method of vindicating interests 
that wrongdoers have injured. The legal process remedies damage to a legal 
interest by punishing, extracting money, and forbidding conduct. These rem-
edies take the form of criminal sanctions, money judgments and injunctions, 
respectively. The process of choosing between money judgments and injunc-
tions is a remedial policy decision of great importance. Judges recognize that 
money is but a substitute which can neither restore nor replace plaintiff's right. 
0 J.D., 1968, University of Iowa; LL.M., 1970; University of Michigan; Godwin Professor of 
Law, William and Mary. 
Thanks to Neil Berkhoff and Hamner Hill for helping to prepare this article. 
I. See Boyce v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 215 (1830); Bonaparte v. Camden, 3 F. Cas. 821, 
827 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No. 1,617); Laycock, Book Review, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1065, 1071 (1979). 
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If social and procedural policy support the decision to enjoin, however, equity's 
"strong arm," the injunction, forbids the ·wrong instead of compensating for its 
occurrence.2 
The courts have altered their application of the inadequacy prerequisite 
without changing their terminology. More and more plaintiffs seek injunctions 
to protect statutory, common law, and constitutional entitlements to less and 
less palpable interests. Commentators note that litigants raise the inadequacy 
prerequisite less frequently3 and that contemporary judges grant more injunc-
tions than their predecessors.4 The inadequacy prerequisite has been eroded, 
operating today in a less formidable, more limited fashion. 
There are several related reasons for the inadequacy prerequisite's less 
prominent role. Due to the merger of law and equity into one form of civil 
action, equity is now simply a set of rules instead of a subordinate, supple-
mentary system of courts.5 Procedural flexibility tells today's judges to award 
all litigants the relief or remedy appropriate on the facts, provided that 
prejudice can be avoided.6 Judges possess more self-confidence in their ability 
to solve problems and they are more willing to protect nonpecuniary, im-
palpable interests. Witness the practical abolition of Lord Chancellor Eldon's 
prerequisite that "equity protects property rights, not personal rights."7 Finally, 
constitutional litigation has increased; and, except for the injunction, judges 
have yet to discover a way to reapportion a legislature, desegregate a school, or 
restructure a mental hospital.8 
INADEQUACY TODAY 
Perceptive contemporary commentators have mounted powerful and per-
suasive attacks on the inadequacy prerequisite, even in its eroded state. Pro-
fessor Hammond views the inadequacy prequisite as a pernicious anachronism. 
"This historical constraint is now grossly overstated and is one of the con-
temporary shibboleths of the law."9 All agree that judges should cease choosing 
between money and personal remedies "according to tests devised to avoid 
conflicts of jurisdiction between two independent systems of courts."l0 
Remedial activists uniformly assert that it is immoral for the judge to sit 
2. See W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §§18-19, at 31-33 (2d ed. 1956); 
H.· McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §43, at 103 (2d ed. 1948). 
3. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES §2.5, at 61 (1973). 
4. W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY §25 (1930); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 525, 548 (1978); Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 
HARv. L. REv. 994, 996 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. 
5. 11 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2944, at 393-94 (1973); 
Developments, supra note 4, at 996. 
6. See FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c); 11 C. WRIGHT&: A. MILLER, supra note 5, §2644. 
7. Developments, supra note 4, at 998-1001. 
8. 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4-5 (1978); Laycock, supra note 1, at 1068-69. 
See Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REv. 132, 167-68 (1981); Developments, 
supra note 4, at 1007, 1013, 1020. 
9. Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. ToRONTO L.J • 
. 240, 276 (1980). 
10. Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DEl'. L.J. 376, 378 (1955). 
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idly while a wrong occurs and then merely compensate the victim.11 Yet, Pro-
fessor Fiss argues that injunctions are subordinated to damages on the remedial 
hierarchy because injunctive relief is conditioned on satisfaction of the inade-
quacy prerequisite while the damage remedy is not. "The inadequacy of al-
ternative remedies must be demonstrated before the injunction can be utilized, 
but there is no reciprocal requirement on those alternative remedies.''12 He 
suggests that judges should choose between remedies without regard to hier-
archy; instead, they should analyze the alternative remedies' technical ad-
vantages and the way they allocate power.13 The Harvard Law Review finds 
untenable any presumption in favor of one form of relief. It asks judges to 
choose between remedies only after carefully studying the individual situation 
instead of stating a general preference for damage reliefY· 
In the face of this formidable criticism, this article assesses the inadequacy 
prerequisite's present foundation. The remedial policy question necessarily 
involved in such a discussion is whether to vindicate a substantive interest with 
money or seek to assure enjoyment of the interest in fact. Arguably, judges 
decide the remedy issue by evaluating the same factors that they considered 
when deciding whether to create a substantive duty. To distinguish claims for 
cash from those for conduct, judges ask economic, moral, and administrative 
questions.15 Our materialistic society considers money an acceptable substitute 
for most recognized interests. But if judges view plaintiff's interest as too 
morally or economically important to allow defendant to simply pay for its 
injury and if persuasive administrative arguments against an injunction are 
lacking, then the remedy at law will be inadequate.16 
EcoNoMIC FAcroRS 
The inadequacy prerequisite expresses to judges that at times, even though 
a legally cognizable injury has yet to occur, they should allow the injury and 
then compute money damages. Thus, in deciding whether to enjoin conduct, 
11. See W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 2, §19; Wright, supra note 10, at 382. See generally 
Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restate-
ment, 81 CoLUl\L L. REv. 110, 120-30 (1981); Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 
YALE L.J. 271 (1979). 
12. 0. Fiss, supra note 8, at 39. 
13. Id. at 91. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §359(1), Comment a (1981); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, ch. 48. topic 2, introductory note (1979). 
14. Developments, supra note 4, at 994, 1020-21 (1965). 
15. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 1014 
(1928). 
16. See Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278 (1871); Developments, supra note 4, at 1020. Think-
ers who emphasize economics may advocate a larger role for the economic factor. They may 
assert that increasing society's wealth is most important, that legal doctrine is good only if it 
increases wealth, and that in a society where wealth is finite, waste is immoral. Moral, eco-
nomic, and administrative are not hermetic categories. In fact, much of the same reasoning 
appears, stated differently, under these separate headings. I separate them here to achieve 
more analytical precision, but I realize that they are often mixed and that some emphasize 
one factor more than others. Economic analysis, however, may lead to a market approach 
that values everything in money. This supports a view which prefers money damages to in-
junctions, an approach I reject. 
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the judge must consider the damage formula which will apply if the conduct 
occurs. Accordingly, a short survey of monetary compensation is in order. 
The remedial theory of compensation instructs judges to aspire to place 
the aggrieved party in the same position as if no injury had occurred. Compen-
sation practice, however, belies this aspiration, and countervailing considera-
tions can often attenuate damages. For example, lost profits from a new busi-
ness are too speculative to award. Aggravation from a breached contract is not 
recoverable. For evidentiary and administrative reasons, judges use an objective 
marketplace concept called value to measure consummated losses. Victims are 
allowed to recover what others would have paid in an open bargaining en-
vironment. Therefore, recovery for subjective losses such as sentimental at-
tachment to a family home or pet may be barred.17 
The language utilized to measure monetary damage is implacably impre-
cise. This derives, in part, from the goal of awarding plaintiff money to create 
a counterfactual hypothetical: the situation "as if" defendant had not violated 
the substantive law which protected plaintiff's interest. The terms injury, com-
pensation, loss, and value are inextricably tied to the scope of the substantive in-
terest. Courts, however, also use money awards to deter, to vindicate subjective 
interests, and to punish.18 As part of the attempt to advance each of the fore-
going policies, courts valuate intangible interests like reputati<?n and privacy, 
thereby increasing the imprecision. Courts further exacerbate the confusion by 
presuming that plaintiff suffered the amount of damage that normally would 
have occurred. Finally, the terms are designed to resolve individual disputes 
rather than to guide parties in their conduct. Remedial rules merely focus the 
judge's or the jury's critical faculties on the important features of the present 
controversy. 
Damage theory is predicated on a theory of economic inadequacy.19 Valua-
tion is imperfect, and it omits significant subjective impairments which de-
serve legal protection. The courts try to protect interests in sentiment, 
autonomy, continuity, and individuality that defy economic expression.2D 
Objective damages determined by a judge or jury may fail to compensate 
the plaintiff for the total impairment the law recognizes. If substantive law 
protects more than remedial law recompenses, then the resulting doctrinal 
imbalance can be resolved by either trimming the substantive interest or 
by inflating the remedial measure. The courts have, however, solved this 
remedial problem by abandoning money damages. They enjoin to vindicate the 
legally recognized but subjective or sentimental impairment which damages 
doctrine neglects to recompense. Courts prefer to enjoin when defendant's cost 
to obey the injunction falls between the amount of money damage a court 
would award plaintiff and the plaintiff's total legal impairment. If the court 
simply awards monetary damages, the defendant will probably continue his 
actions. The injunction which forces the defendant to either stop the activity 
17. D. DoBBS, supra note 3, §3.2 at 145. 
18. I d. §3.1, at 135-36; I F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTS §5.30, at 468 (1956). 
19. Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 1563, 1566-69 (1975). 
20. See Losee v. Morey, 57 Barb. 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1865). 
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or to confront plaintiff's uncompensated impairment will allocate resources 
more efficiently. 
Pollution actions concretely illustrate the inadequacy of monetary compen-
sation. Katz states that a property owner who is a victim of pollution and 
establishes his substantive case "would still have to establish a dollar equivalent 
for his discomfort in order to recover damages." The market test may render 
his valuation exceedingly difficult, as the very industrial development which 
polluted plaintiff's environment may also have increased the value of his prop-
erty. The plaintiff may disavow his monetary interest, and convincingly char-
acterize his home as the place in which he wishes to reside in comfort. How-
ever persuasively he argues, his subjective interest in the enjoyment of his land 
resists monetary valuation. "The courts are accustomed to a coldly economic 
calculation of damages to residential real property."21 Money is, therefore, an 
inadequate remedy for pollution, because it covers only part of the impair-
ment society seeks to protect. 
Judges create legally protectable interests by affixing the term property. 
They enhance the protection accorded property and other interests by deciding 
that damages are an inadequate remedy. This inadequacy decision hinges in 
part on whether plaintiff's money remedy appropriately compensates his sub-
stantive right; it comprises judgments about both remedy and right. Thus, 
judges grant injunctions when the plaintiff's threatened interest is legally 
cognizable but consists of uncompensable subjective and sentimental intangi-
bles.22 
We tend to assume, therefore, that courts enjoin when money damages ap-
pear to undercompensate. Judges, however, may also enjoin when damages 
might overcompensate. This is likely to occur only when plaintiff's threatened 
interest is abstract or subjective. In such situations money damages may be 
more than merely inadequate, and the judge may grant equitable relief when 
legal relief would be refused.23 The judge recognizes plaintiff's injury but 
realizes that "it would be harsh to impose damages for an amount conjectured 
by the jury where none are actually proved.''24 Therefore, in addition to pro-
tecting plaintiffs' subjective impairment, the inadequacy prerequisite insulates 
defendants from excessive jury verdicts. 
Courts, however, generally respond to a conflict they perceive to be eco-
nomic by limiting the claimant to damages. For example, in the famous de-
cision Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,25 New York's court of appeals refused 
to enjoin operation of a cement plant even though it was a nuisance. The court 
admitted that money damages were inadequate; however, it balanced the 
equities against an injunction, and found that the defendant would have had 
21. Note, supra note 19, at 1567 n.15. 
22. See R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw §4.12 (2d ed. 1977); Note, supra note 19, 
at 1587. 
23. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY at 103-48 (1950). 
24. Id. at 132. 
25. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1970). See also Calabresi & Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. 
REv. 1089, 1120 n.60 (1972). 
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to spend far more to comply with the injunction than the cost of the loss the 
plaintiffs sustained. The court feared that the plaintiffs would exploit the in-
junction by threatening to close the cement plant unless the defendant settled 
for an amount far in excess of their property losses, yet less than the cost of the 
plant. Thus, the court viewed the conflict as economic and remitted the plain-
tiffs to an objective damage recovery because an injunction would unfairly 
balance settlement negotiations.2s 
Similarly, courts are reluctant to enjoin breaches of contract or to require 
promisors to perform contracts. Some argue that courts remit nonbreaching 
parties to an objective measure of lost profit to allow parties to ignore contracts 
when breach is cost effective. This encourages contracting parties to breach 
and pay damages when total profit from breach exceeds profit from completion. 
Accordingly, resources are allocated efficiently because they flow to those willing 
to pay the most for them, and performance is encouraged because the breach-
ing party pays the nonbreaching party tl1e resulting lost profit.27 
Professor Kronman's recent article28 adds an administrative dimension to 
this economic calculus. Courts order a breaching party to perform contracts 
only when the subject of its performance is unique. If the court were lim-
ited to money damages in such situations, it would have to calculate the 
equivalent amount of cash to substitute for the victim's loss. It would be, he 
says, "very difficult and expensive for a court to acquire the information neces-
sary to make these determinations."29 The parties cannot be relied upon to be 
anything but self-interested. When the information is scarce, imprecise and 
unreliable, the tribunal must fear that a damage award will fall short of or 
exceed the amount necessary to achieve reasonable compensation. 
Professor Kronman concludes that uniqueness of subject matter is a proper 
basis for granting specific performance. He explains a great deal about one 
tacit economic-administrative inquiry into the inadequacy question: "a court 
is really saying that it cannot obtain, at reasonable cost, enough information 
about substitutes to permit it to calculate an award of money damages without 
imposing an unacceptably high risk of under-compensation on the injured 
[party].''30 When the tribunal seeks to redress the impalpable and intangible 
impairments discussed above, any money equivalent is necessarily speculative 
and conjectural. To vindicate the recognized interest while avoiding the risk 
of either over- or under-compensating, the court concludes that money is in-
adequate and enjoins. 
Judges often value unique and unmeasurable impairments after injury has 
already occurred. A ready though imprecise measure of future damages, how-
ever, will not prevent a judge from enjoining future infringement of many 
property and statutory monopoly interests. In addition to avoiding imprecise 
measurement, these injunctions advance related economic and administrative 
policies. Injunctions serve the economic policy of private ordering by recogniz-
26. See generally Note, supra note 19, at 1566-69. 
27. R. Posner, supra note 22, §7.2. 
28. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 351 (1978). 
29. Id. at 360. 
30. Id. at 362. 
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ing that people know their wants better than judges; an injunction actually 
forces the parties to bargain privately. The alternative of granting damages 
allows a defendant to pay judicially set damages which are administratively 
unsound because they are both more expensive and less precise. Finally, in-
junctions prevent a form of compulsory licensing or private eminent domain.31 
Although economic considerations generally direct the court to advise the 
plaintiff to take the cash and accept the conduct, they may indicate that an 
injunction will enhance the substantive interest in a salutory fashion. 
MoRAL FAcroRS 
An examination of moral factors focuses attention on the weight of the 
plaintiff's substantive interest. Some substantive interests are so basic that 
courts think people deserve to enjoy them in fact. Monetary compensation 
tolerates the wrong and allows the perpetrator to buy injustice. Although this 
may be proper in many situations, courts have identified a class of interests 
which are too important to sanction continued injury by merely imposing 
money damages. They conclude that it is "improper or unfair to allow the 
defendant unjustifiably to inflict harm on [a victim], leaving the latter with 
no alternative but to seek money compensation.''32 For example, Louisell and 
Hazard state in their procedure casebook, "Even though a monetary loss can 
be determined with relative precision, it has been considered inappropriate, 
perhaps unthinkable, to award damages relief in cases involving school segre-
gation, prison and hospital mistreatment, and ecological injury.''33 
It contravenes our notion of constitutional rights to permit them to be 
reduced "to a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the 
victims.''34 Moreover, damage redress is an insufficient remedy even when plain-
tiff can demonstrate no practical impairment from defendant's violation of his 
constitutional right. For example, in Bell v. Southwell,35 after a racially dis-
criminatory election the black minority was unable to prove that the outcome 
would have been more favorable had the authorities obeyed the constitution. 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit ordered another election because such practices 
infect the processes of the law and diminish the interests of all.36 
Judges passing on interlocutory injunctions conclude that constitutional 
violations cause irreparable injury.37 It is unacceptable to argue that air-
port officials should be allowed to exclude people with political or religious 
31. Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: 
Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107, 1128 (1977). 
32. Developments, supra note 4, at 1020. See also Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 160·61. 
33. D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 109 (4th 
ed. 1979); but seeR. PosNER, supra note 22, §27.2 at 258. 
34. 0. Frss, supra note 8, at 75. See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (dicta); 
Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre·condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief?, 52 
N.C.L. REV. 1091, 1117·18 (1974). 
35. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). 
36. I d. at 665. See Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 165·69. 
37. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 
(1974). 
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leaflets by simply paying damages. Thus, equitable relief is no longer supple-
mentary or extraordinary in this category of adjudication. This approach sub-
stitutes a preference for performance in constitutional and civil rights litiga-
tion.38 
The inadequacy prerequisite may also be judicially or legislatively attenu-
ated, or eliminated to express the public policy that there are certain rights 
which people should enjoy in fact. California's water control act provides that 
in actions seeking equitable relief "it shall not be necessary to allege or prove 
... that the remedy at law is inadequate .... "39 California's air pollution legis-
lation is similar.40 The legislature responded explicitly to the public's strong 
desire to protect and enhance the environment. As the Boomer decision il-
lustrates, however, the strong countervailing consideration to resolve economic 
controversies with money damages militates against injunctions, and the fac-
tors that render damages adequate may emerge in new form at a later stage 
when the judge balances the equities. 
Constitutional interests may also induce a judge to allow damages and deny 
an injunction. For example, assume that defendant's 200 page book devoted to 
important comment on political affairs includes all 16 lines of plaintiffs copy-
righted poem. Plaintiff sues charging copyright infringement and seeks dam-
ages and to enjoin dissemination of the book. The public interest in reading 
the offending work may persuade the judge to award plaintiff money damage 
but refuse to enjoin the defendant. This solution allows readers to receive de-
fendant's work and advances the first amendment; but it also pays the copy-
right proprietor for his creation.41 Thus, a strong constitutional interest over-
rides the copyright proprietor's generally unquestioned power to enjoin an in-
fringer. 
As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, today's remedial law has broken 
through many of yesterday's doctrinal limitations. Judges usually comprehend 
their obligation to decide remedy in light of public aspirations. The law has 
grown in response to external pressures articulated through the experience and 
skill of advocates and judges. Although this movement is not completely 
amenable to logical analysis, it can safely be concluded that courts are side-
stepping constrictive and anachronistic doctrine and are considering current 
policy and process realities. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS 
Process cannot be eliminated from substantive or remedial decisions. As 
Leon Green said of tort law, "[d]uties must await the court's finding a work-
able method by which they can be given meaning. Morals, justice, business, 
and purification of the social stream by prophylactic treatment, must all abide 
38. 0. FISS, supra note 8, at 92; Laycock, supra note 1, at 1069. 
39. CAL. WATER CoDE §13361(c) (West 1971). 
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§39437, 41513 (West Supp. 1971). 
41. See Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 983, 1030 
(1970); Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 85, 119 (1978). 
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the time when the court has adjusted its scheme of things to the exigencies of 
its internal affairs."42 
Courts prefer to award damages partly because judges believe that injunc-
tions create more potential process and procedural burdens. Administrative 
concerns loom larger in equity than in law. It is difficult to adjudicate, formu-
late, administer, and enforce injunctions.43 Monetary compensation may avoid 
the additional administrative expense of injunctions. Thus, the inadequacy 
prerequisite prevents litigants from shifting these costs to the court system, and 
ultimately to the taxpayers, unless absolutely necessary.44 
Two major administrative factors, jury trial and enforcement, persuade 
courts to award money damages. Chancellor Kent expressed his preference for 
money damages on these two grounds in the 1823 decision, jerome v. Ross: 
"The objection to the injunction, in cases of private trespass, except 
under very special circumstances, is, that it would be productive of 
public inconvenience, by drawing cases of ordinary trespass within the 
cognizance of equity, and by calling forth, upon all occasions, its power 
to punish by attachment, fine and imprisonment, for a further com-
mission of trespass, instead of the more gentle common law remedy by 
action, and the assessment of damages by a jury."45 
The contemporary efficacy of a policy that favors jury trials and in rem en-
forcement will be examined below. 
Judges decide factual issues in equitable actions, including those for in-
junctions. In contrast, litigants have a right to a jury in actions at common 
law.46 This is a product of history: the English court that granted equitable 
remedies operated without a jury, and our constitution adopted that system:n 
The inadequacy decision determines whether to preclude a binding jury 
verdict.48 The debate about the civil jury will be with us for some time.49 
42. Green, supra note 15, at 1045. 
43. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 5, §2944, at 394; Developments, supra note 
4, at 1020; Note, supra note 19, at 1566 n.l3. 
44. Kronman, supra note 28, at 373. See also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 294 (masters paid 
by parties). 
45. 7 John Ch R 315, 333 (18~:3). 
46. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §8.1 at 347·51 (2d ed. 1977). Qualifications 
will be found in Van Heeke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REV. 157 (1953); 
McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. 
v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. I, 10-15 (1967) (discussing the relation between procedural 
inadequacy and the seventh amendment). Professor Hammond regards this as an "archaic" 
distinction which impedes the development of a more modern approach. See Hammond, 
supra note 9, at 277. 
47. 0. Frss, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
48. D. DoBBS, supra note 3, §2.5, at 61. Developments, supra note 4, at 1004-1019. See also 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 43!J U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing a nonparty to an equitable action 
to preclude the losing defendant from relitigating issues before a jury in a later damage action 
against the equitable defendant). 
49. Compare Griswold, 1962-63 Dean's Report: Harvard Law School 5 (1963) with Green, 
Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1965). Readers may consult my views in 
Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 KY. L.J. 769 (1977). 
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Elitists view jurors as incompetent or biased, and favor judicial factfinding. 
However, the idea of life-tenured federal judges interpreting the constitution 
to check the excesses of other more populistic branches of government, is it-
self elitist. Nonetheless, few who favor judicial activism will view injunctive 
relief from deprivation of constitutional rights with alarm. Conversely, others 
feel that jurors inject common sense and the public's concern into the litigation 
process. They tend to be suspicious about ·massive changes brought about by 
judges alone. 
Judges consider some important substantive interests too basic to be com-
pensable ·with money. They perceive the same interests to be too important to 
be frustrated by jurors. Perverse jury verdicts damage substantive interests and 
nullify substantive law. Preventing distorted factfinding preserves the substan-
tive law's integrity. Thus, as the potential for social harm from an incorrect 
jury verdict increases, the likelihood that the judge will defer to the jury de-
creases. The decision that the remedy at law is inadequate in a category of law-
suits may reflect the moral determination that the jury should not be per-
mitted to frustrate the underlying substantive law.50 
Three other features of the jury system may influence the inadequacy de-
cision. New jur~rs are picked for each trial, jury members lack expertise, and 
juries deliberate secretly until they achieve unanimity. These characteristics 
become pivotal when it is realized that many equity actions last for years. 
Federal judges have undertaken to reform schools, mental hospitals, and 
prisons with what Professor Fiss calls structural injunctions.51 These judges 
have learned that reorganizing a social institution is no easy task. Deciding 
where substantive rights exist, formulating satisfactory remedial standards for 
future conduct, and enforcing the remedy become coextensive tasks. In asking 
whether the remedy at law is adequate, the judge compares the jury's amateur-
ism with judicial professionalism, accountability, and continuity.52 Thus, the 
characteristics of juries determine, in part, whether a remedy at law is inade-
quate. As juryless equity is somewhat a contradiction in terms, some jurisdic-
tions established binding equity juries.53 But the candid observer must ask 
whether the federal judiciary could perform many of the tasks it presently 
undertakes, particularly structural injunctions, with an equity jury. 
Judges deciding whether to prefer monetary compensation over an injunc-
tion must also examine the way the ·winner enforces the remedy.54 Money 
remedies are enforced impersonally. A judgment debtor owes no obedience to 
a money judgment. The sheriff with a legal ·writ seizes and sells the debtor's 
property, the law extinguishes the debtor's ovmership, and the money is paid 
to the judgment creditor. 
One covering the methods available to collect a money claim travels over 
50. See Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. 
L. REv. 903, 903-09 (1971). 
51. 0. FISS, supra note 8, at 7. 
52. Id. at 55-58. 
53. Van Heeke, supra note 45, at 158. 
54. Developments, supra note 4, at 1004, 1019. 
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rough terrain.55 Nevertheless, the remedy at law is a cleaner, more impersonal 
remedy to enforce.56 Judges enforce injunctions personally by assuming that 
the defendant will obey and, failing obedience, by holding the defendant in 
contempt. Judges employ coercive fines and imprisonment to induce the con-
temnor to obey. Contempt contains significant peaks and ravines. Judges and 
plaintiffs deal with stubborn people, and they wield the law's blunt tools to 
forge not simple acquiesence but compliance. While tracing the progress of 
Christianity in Europe during the late Roman Empire, Gibbon said "It is 
incumbent on the authors oE persecution previously to reflect whether they are 
determined to support it in the last extreme. They excite the flame which they 
strive to extinguish; and it soon becomes necessary to chastise the contumacy, 
as well as the crime of the offender."57 The problems of breach and enforce-
ment should be considered before turning to any personal remedy.58 
In deciding whether to enjoin someone from interfering with domestic 
relations,59 to order an act out of the jurisdiction,60 or to grant an injunction 
against a political body,61 courts have asked whether it will be difficult or 
impossible to secure compliance. Disobedience will cause the court to lose 
prestige, and the risk may compel reluctance to enjoin.62 Considering the like-
lihood of obedience in adjudicating remedy, however, improperly renders 
plaintiff's substantive right a hostage to defendant's obduracy. 
Further, the judge's commitment to securing obedience exacerbates the 
consequences of incorrect factfinding.63 If the debtor tells the judge that he lost 
the creditors' $20,000 while hunting birds, the judge may disbelieve him. To 
encourage the debtor to remember where the money is, the judge may declare 
the debtor in contempt and imprison him.64 The shadow of the prison walls 
quickens many memories. But what if the debtor told the truth? How long 
must the debtor remain in jail before the judge concludes that his tale, though 
unlikely, was not untrue? 
Coercive enforcement is psychologically taxing, protracted, and costly to all 
55. V. COUNTRYMAN, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 1-179 (1974). 
56. Impersonal enforcement at law may become personal in supplementary or interroga-
tory proceedings where judges use in personam orders enforced with coercive contempt. Id. 
at 100-109. 
57. 2 E. GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE ch. 37, at 
373-74 (Modern Library). 
58. Structural injunctions are a noteworthy exception. They are enforced with motions 
to modify. What judges and litigants call contempt in the structural process is usually 
maneuvering for position and invitation to parley. See Drake, judicial Implementation and 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 32 ALA. L. REv. 299, 308 (1981); Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 78 W.VA. L. REv. 155, 168-70 (19i6). 
59. Hadley v. Hadley, 323 Mich. 555, 36 N.W.2d 144 (1949). 
60. See, e.g., Penn v. Lord :Baltimore, 27 Eng. Rep. II32 (Ch. 1750); II C. WRIGHT &: 
A. MILLER, supra note 5, §2945, at 402-03. 
61. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,487-88 (1903). 
62. See, e.g., Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 534, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1946). 
See also W. WALSH, supra note 4, §18, at 80; Kronman, supra note 28, at 374. 
63. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183,266 (1971). 
64. Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 302 (1937). See also Dobbs, 
supra note 63, at 220 n.l45. 
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concerned. Moreover, coercive imprisonment imposes the cost of the con-
temnor's lost enterprise on society. The judge may also face the embarrassing 
problem of a contemnor who steadfastly refuses to comply, regardless of the 
consequences. In response, judges have developed a number of ingenious de-
vices to discourage obduracy and to reduce the embarrassment of incorrect 
factfinding and terminally stubborn contemnors.65 In contrast, the inadequacy 
prerequisite obviates the need to resort to these devices where money damages 
will suffice. 
Remedial activists base their preference for injunctions on the unstated 
premise that defendants obey injunctions. They tell judges to enjoin when 
damages are difficult to compute66 or when defendant cannot pay a money 
award.67 The defendant, however, may critically evaluate the consequences of 
noncompliance and choose to disobey. The defendant has already demon-
strated the ·willingness and ability to thwart the substantive right. He may, 
.therefore, treat the resulting remedy 1vith similar irreverence. An injunction 
stops conduct only as well as a stop sign halts a car; the defendant must apply 
the brakes and obey.os 
Personalizing the substantive standard in an injunction may only postpone 
the necessity of dealing with the lawbreaker. Granting an injunction when 
plaintiff's damages are difficult to compute may only reschedule the computa-
tion for the compensatory contempt proceeding which follows defendant's non-
compliance.69 If the insolvent defendant breaches an injunction, a compensa-
tory contempt award may amount to little more than an inadequate uncollecta-
ble money judgment.70 Simply calling a contempt award compensatory will 
not cause nonexistent assets to materialize. A daily fine cannot effectively 
coerce an insolvent to pay a compensatory award, and resort to coercive im-
prisonment may amount to incarceration for a civil debt.11 Analyzing the in-
junction from the perspective of enforcement reveals some logic in Chancellor 
Kent's preference for cash. 
Finally, administrative celerity may favor equity, for injunctions may serve 
efficient, economical administration. Consider the defendant who carries a 
good joke too far. Courts have said that when plaintiff requires multiple dam-
age actions to halt continuing or repeated harmful conduct, the remedy at 
law is inadequate.72 Enjoining these invasions serves the economic and admin-
65. See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948) (incorrect factfinding); In re Cueto, 443 
F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stubborn contemnor). 
66. Developments, supra note 4, at 1020 (1965). 
67. See Pound, The Progress of the Law -Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 420, 430 (1920). See 
generally Newman, The Effect of Insolvency on Equitable Relief, 13 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 44 
(1938) (stressing effect on defendant's other creditors). 
68. Professor Wright expressed this insight earlier with a different metaphor. "The in· 
junction is not a set of handcuffs. In itself it cannot prevent the defendant from doing the 
criminal act." Wright, supra note 10, at 391 n.65. See also Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 729 (1978). 
69. E.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958). 
70. See, e.g., Chapel v. Hull, 60 Mich. 167, 26 N.W. 874 (1886). 
71. Potterv. Wilson, 609 P.2d 1278 (Okla.1980). 
72. W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY, §20 (2d ed. 1956); H. McCLINToCK, 
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istrative goal of freeing expensive judicial machinery for other controversies. 
Most defendants obey injunctions. Converting a civil standard from a damage 
rule into a personalized criminal statute and introducing the risk of criminal 
contempt may persuade the defendant to become a better citizen. 
CONCLUSION 
This article attempts to bring some order to the judicial inquiry into when 
to enjoin instead of award money damages. Perhaps courts have failed to 
articulate the considerations that enlighten the choice between equitable and 
damage remedies because, as the reader has learned, it is a difficult, if not im-
possible task. A series of shadowy and overlapping economic, moral and ad-
ministrative criteria compete for attention. In a vital society, certainty and 
definiteness are illusory. In fashioning rules for a particular controversy or for 
a healthy future, policymakers may conclude that in certain instances, specific 
relief will vindicate an important interest better than damages. Some interests 
worth recognizing are speculative and conjectural, and are too difficult to 
valuate. Some interests may be both noneconomic and impalpable, while others 
are simply too important to be valued only in money. The remedy, however, 
often fails to comport with the substance of the interest. 
Some progress could be made by discarding the hypothetical approach to 
the remedial inquiry. Courts employ the term remedy to describe a world 
where the defendant complied with the substantive standard. This approach 
welds remedy to violation. A more fluid view of law, the legal process, and 
remedies instructs us that this model masks many aspects of reality. More 
realistic remedial goals are pluralistic: to decide disputes, to express values, to 
advance substantive purpose, to allocate risks, to encourage private ordering, 
and to maintain and restore legitimacy. We should not insist upon a remedy 
congruent with the violation.73 We should, in short, adopt remedial goals that 
coincide more closely to the economic, moral, and administrative inquires that 
this article urges courts to undertake in deciding whether damages are inade-
quate. 
In particular, the inadequacy prerequisite is neither a technical or mechan-
ical test, nor a callous subordination of injunctions to damages. Inadequacy is 
a pliable term that describes a matter of degree. Its definition has changed and 
will continue to change in response to policy and process. In some substantive 
areas, the commentator flirts with inaccuracy by referring to a prequisite. Un-
fortunately, the legal conclusion that the legal remedy is inadequate masks the 
intellectual process of identifying and evaluating interests. Moreover, though 
the inadequacy prerequisite has proved flexible enough to adopt to changed 
conditions, it grants excessive discretion and is too imprecise to ensure pre-
dictability. To expose that intellectual process and to constrain discretion with 
a rude set of standards are t.he modest goals of the present effort. 
HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §46 (2d ed. 1948); Developments, supra note 4, at 
1001. 
73. Fiss, The Supreme Cou1·t 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 46-50 (1980); Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 170. 
